Abstract
Introduction
The growing size and complexity of systems is increasing the pressure for reliable software. In high-integrity and safety-critical areas, reliability is a requirement enforced by regulators, but it is usually difficult to verify correctness and ascertain reliability through software testing or imprecise development processes. Formal methods are software development techniques that allow an accurate characterisation of the problem domain that is firmly based on mathematics; by applying standard mathematical analyses, these methods can be used to prove the correctness of systems.
The idea of applying mathematical modelling and analysis in software development processes is not new. Although it requires different expertise and development processes, when compared with traditional development life-cycles, it has been used successfully in industrial applications, such as electronic banking [25] , and is widely accepted academically with several decades of experience. With tools backed by mature theory, formal methods are becoming more effective, and their use is easier to justify, not as an academic or legal requirement, but as a business case. That is, despite the initial extra effort, the gains formal methods afford in terms of reliability, accountability, and precision, saves money. Also, as tool maturity rises, levels of expertise from the user tend to decrease, hence de-skilling the process and making it cheaper to industrialise.
These recent advances in theory and tool support have inspired industrial and academic researchers to join up in an international Grand Challenge in Verified Software [8] , and have created a sense of urgency in making its objectives a reality. Work has started with the creation of a Verified Software Repository (VSR) with two principal aims: (i) verified software components; and (ii) industrial-scale verification experiments with considerable theoretical significance and tool-support impact [6] .
Related work
The first VSR pilot project experiment took place during 2006: the successful mechanisation of a sanitised version of the first ITSEC Level 6 high-integrity Mondex smart-card banking application [25] . In that experiment, seven groups used different theories and tools to mechanise the Mondex refinement and its verification [27] . Another work that we might benefit from is implementation in occam of a "POSIX -aware" small operating system [4] .
In the next section, we briefly describe what makes a pilot project and the reasons for our choice of the POSIX interface for file stores. In Section 3, we present the scope of the work, together with important design decisions and a revised abstract specification. Next, Section 4 presents a refinement strategy, as well as the concrete implementation for which the refinement is proved using Z/Eves. We briefly summarise the calculated preconditions for both abstract and concrete operations in Section 5. After that, Section 6 shows mechanisation issues and statistics, which serves as both basic theories for other experiments, and benchmarks for different theories and tools. Finally, Section 7 summaries our achievements and discusses future work.
What makes a pilot project?
In [14] , Joshi & Holzmann suggest a pilot project for the grand challenge. They characterise, motivate, and justify an interesting choice for formal verification as a minichallenge. In this view, the grand challenge is broken into smaller projects with considerable relevance according to the following features: "(a) it would be of sufficient complexity that traditional methods, such as testing and code reviews, are inadequate to establish its correctness"; "(b) it would be of sufficient simplicity that specification, design and verification could be completed by a dedicated team in a relatively short time, say 2-3 years"; "and (c) it would be of sufficient importance that successful completion would have an impact beyond the verification community", and to both academia and industry.
At the Menlo Park workshop at SRI [24], the POSIX file-store interface of the Linux Kernel [13] was suggested as a candidate pilot project. In particular, the suggestion involved a small subset of POSIX suitable for flash-memory hardware with strict fault-tolerant requirements to be used by forthcoming NASA missions. Due to the nature of the environment this small subset would run in, two important robustness requirements for fault-tolerance were later agreed [5] : (i) no corruption in the presence of unexpected power loss; and (ii) recovery from faults specific to flash hardware (i.e., bad blocks, read errors, bit corruption due to radiation, etc.). In recovery from power loss in particular, they require the file system to be reset-reliable in the following sense: if an operation Op is in progress at the time of a power loss, then on reboot, the file system state will be as if Op either has successfully completed or has never started.
POSIX file system
The choice for the POSIX file-system interface is interesting for various reasons: (i) it is a clean, well-defined, and standard interface that has been stable for many years; (ii) underlying data structures and algorithms are also well understood; (iii) although a small part of an operating system, it is complex enough in terms of reliability guarantees, such as unexpected power loss, concurrent access, or data corruption; and (iv) modern information technology is massively dependent on reliable and secure/safe information availability. All these reasons go beyond the verification community interest, as well as the intended initial use on forthcoming NASA missions, as developed by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL).
An initial subset of POSIX has been chosen for the pilot project. There is no support for: (a) file permissions; (b) hard or symbolic-links; and (c) entities other than traditional files and directories (e.g., no pipes, sockets, etc.). Adding support for (a) is not difficult and may be done later, whereas support for (b) and (c) is more difficult and might be beyond the scope of the challenge. In any case, popular flash-memory file-systems, such as YAFFS2 [29] , also do not support these features since they are not typically needed for the embedded environment in which flash devices usually reside.
We choose to focus on basic functionality for files and directories, starting from the former.
This includes APIs singled out by JPL, such as creat, open, close, read, write, truncate, ftruncate, stat, fstat, mkdir, rmdir, rename, opendir, readdir, rewinddir, closedir, etc, where documentation is found in [17] . In addition, we have also considered systemwide operations, such as format, mount, and unmount. This means that we are not initially concerned with encryption, directory listing, regular expressions, and other utility operations, since they are usually built on the top of this basic functionality. Also, JPL opted for the very conservative guarantee about concurrent behaviour that the result of executing concurrent operations is equivalent to executing them in some serial order. This of course comes at some performance cost, which is being traded for simplicity. This simplification may be too strict a requirement for a general embedded file system, so this issue remains open in the context of the grand challenge.
These APIs were originally formally specified in [18] using the Z notation [23] (in August 1995) during the development of requirements for the POSIX standard itself [11] (in July 1995). That is, an abstract specification capturing these requirements in Z was created from the set of informal requirements to show how they were sometimes ambiguous or contradictory. This Z specification served as a guideline for the actual version of the POSIX standard [13] (from February 1998). In fact, the Z specification from 1995 [18] was inspired by an earlier, even more abstract formal definition of UNIX file systems given in [16] . And that is our starting point for the functional requirements as well. As the POSIX standardisation body chose the Z notation, and we are quite familiar with this notation, we follow suit and start the work in Z as well. Nevertheless, this is not necessarily a requirement, and other formalism such as B [22] or Circus [28] could be used as well.
In our approach to this pilot project proposal, we follow an architecture set by Intel in [12] , which explains how to separate and then orthogonally combine different aspects, such as hardware, fault tolerance, and functional requirements for file systems. This architecture is particularly useful for flash-hardware devices. It is also amenable for generalisation to other types of hardware, as well as other faulttolerance concerns. As a scientific (rather than commercial) challenge, this is important in order to move away from NASA 's specific hardware and fault-tolerant requirements.
Abstract specification and operations
In [16] , an abstract specification describing a UNIX filing system is given by defining a few data structures and operations of files and file storage using the Z notation [23] . It is divided in three parts comprising: (i) basic file cre-ation and data manipulation; (ii) file descriptors (or channels) used to access created files and their data (i.e., a file access table); and (iii) directories and links. Although it does not completely model POSIX behaviour, such as error codes or file permissions, it serves as a good starting point for developing our target subset mentioned above. In this paper, we describe the mechanisation and refinement proof of (i) using the Z/Eves theorem prover [21] . We assume general knowledge of Z and refinement [26] .
We parsed, typechecked, and added automation lemmas for the formal material in [16] related to part (i) above. Thanks to theorem proving, in this process alone, we found (and fixed) some inconsistencies, which are discussed below. The abstract specification was a simple function from file identifiers to a sequence of bytes, where initialisation just sets this function (fs) as the empty set. 
To write into a file (f ) at a given offset, the original file (f ) is (possibly) padded with zeros, and the given data (d?) is added at the shifted offset position.
Also, it is worth noting the promotion is specified as (and proved to be) a free promotion [26, p.196] : neither the promotion (ΦFS) nor the global (FS) schemas invariant should place constraints upon the local ([ f : FILE ]) schema. That implies the promoted operations precondition may be expressed in terms of the precondition of the local operation [26, p.211] . That means the precondition of (global) Read (and Write) operations is the conjunction of the precondition of the local operation (on f ) with the promotion schema (ΦFS) [26, p.212] . And that means the calculation of any global operation is considerably simplified, which is quite important for successful mechanisation.
The auxiliary functions from [16] were redefined next, taking into account mechanisation issues.
The zero function returns a FILE of size n with "null" (zero) bytes, whereas ( after ) returns the subfile after the given offset, and ( shift ) returns a shifted file by the given offset. So that, for instance, given a file f (containing the string "Hello" in decimal UNICODEs) within the frame (ΦFS), some data (containing the string " World!", again in decimal UNICODEs), a length 12 (# "Hello World!"), and an offset 5 (# "Hello"). which leads to d! = " World!" from the UNICODEs.
Refinement
We want to refine this abstract specification to a concrete implementation using Z forward simulation [26, , so that it is efficient and close to a general programming language, and hence amenable to prototyping. A possible candidate to represent the file store would be an array or vector, which most languages support.
Before that, we must take into account the finiteness of file systems and file storage for any implementation; hence we add limits to both file sizes and number of files.
MaxFileSize, MaxNoFiles : N 1
Then, we redefine bounded FILE and FS accordingly.
The use of finite function ( →) is important, otherwise the state would be inconsistent (i.e., there will be no model that could represent it) because cardinality (#) requires a finite set. This shows the profitable outcomes of theorem proving, since the original bounded specification was inconsistent [16, p.76] (i.e., it used →). Also, as f ∈ FILE is defined as a sequence it is inheritably finite, hence # f is well defined in FFILE. Another important aspect of FFILE is that because it is a non-empty type (i.e., FFILE ∈ P 1 FILE), the (freely) promoted abstract operations precondition can now be modularly calculated (i.e., the equivalence criterion mentioned in [26, p.211 ] is met). Other issues, such as hardware device capacity or minimum bytes per file, are not considered here; they are addressed in [3] .
Java was chosen as a target language because of the Java Modelling Language (JML) toolset, which gives extra formal support with pre and postcondition, class and loop invariants, and so on [1] . These annotations not only formally document the Java code, but also enable static checking, run-time assertion checking, and other verification tasks to be performed on the target code, such as loop invariant detection [9, 2] . For the concrete datatype, we use Java HashMaps, as they give constant-time performance for most operations, including search and insertion. The benefits of these choices are three-fold: (i) an efficient (and wellknown) implementation for our abstract file store amenable for prototyping; (ii) a new Z (HashMap) data type that can be useful for different modelling purposes; and (iii) an uplift of a JML description that we can use to prove some useful properties. For example, theorem proving has been used [10] to show that Java Set implementation (version 1.3) is not guarded against Russell's paradox [20] ). In this paper, we present the benefits from (i) only, as space restrictions only enable us to portray frames of a longer story. The complete refinement proof for (i) is available in [7, 5] .
A Java HashMap represents Object keys mapped to Object values, where the key's int hashCode() method is used for uniquely indexing the (key, value) pairs into the underlying array-like data structure. The key hash code integer is normalised to a strictly positive integer (N 1 ) via a hashing function (hf ), taking into account the map capacity. So, adding a pair to the map with the code snippet below results in the following hashing operation:
In this model, clashes can happen either when there are more elements than room available, in which case the map could expand, or when badly programmed (i.e., duplicated) hash codes compromise the hashing function. In both cases, Java's robust solution is to have a linked list at points of clash, so that in the worst case one gets a "spiked" map, where many (clashed) entries grow outwards as linked lists. So, in the case of a clash on o with another value, an update would become
Thus, a HashMap is like an injection from hash codes (generated by hf from hashCode()) into sequence of values, which in our case will be finite FILEs "HashMap == hf hashCode seq FFILE " Then, we need to model in Z the Java hashing and clashing mechanisms described above, as FFILE is already concrete enough a choice for mapped values.
Concrete specification
Firstly, we define auxiliary structures that will be the basis of a file system API using Java HashMaps in Z. We also abstract Java hashCode() implementations, which generate a hash code key (hck), with an injection from the corresponding algorithm of the object instance used to generate the hashing value.
[OID]
This injection enables further refinement when we need to be more specific on how hash code keys are generated (i.e., JML pre and postconditions for Java hashCode() implementations). This is in resonance with the JML specification hashCode(), which is just true for both pre and postconditions on a Ξ object state (i.e., side-effect free 
That is, instead of seq FFILE, we have an injective sequence of (unique) pairs of object instances to files. The sequence represents ordering for clashes, where the injectivity (uniqueness) is an optimisation for storage. It also serves as a soundness invariant for the hashCode() of entries, whenever they are values in other maps themselves. At last, to avoid an object instance key being associated with different files, pairs within the sequence (i.e., (o, f ) ∈ ran s) are functional. This avoids file links/aliasing at this physical level, and also facilitates the retrieve relation from abstract (FID, FFILE) pairs from the file store (fs) into concrete (OID, FFILE) pairs from HashMap entries. This model also captures the efficiency concerns for Java HashMap lifted from its JML specification. Told this way round, the story seems more like a fairy tale: a purposeful data structure that magically captures the necessary requirements. In fact, thanks to the scrutiny of theorem proving conducted in the style advocated in [15, 
It uniquely maps hash code indexes into entries (hm partial injection), where all such indexes are valid. That is, they come from the result of the hashing function (hf ), which uses the object instance (o) hash code keys (hashCode()) result modulo the initial capacity of the map. Together with the loadfactor, these variables are useful to allow constanttime complexity for insertion and search into the map, assuming the hashing function disperses hashCode() results adequately. This establishes the link between hash code indexes within the map (i ∈ dom hm), and object instances (o) whose hashCode() algorithm we are interested into. Also, idx defines the current allocation position some mapping operations require.
The hashing function is trivially defined using integer division remainder, bearing in mind the (strictly positive) capacity of the involved map.
This provides separation of concerns, so that different implementations can provide more efficient hashing mechanisms, without changing the clashing mechanism and other mapping operations, some of which are defined below.
Concrete operations
As in the abstract version, state initialisation is trivial, where known indexes are initialised with empty entries, which in Java reflects the instantiation of Entry objects. We must also ensure there is always an algorithm to go from an OID to its hashCode(), which is trivially true as Java OID are never empty types.
InitHMFS HMFS ; c?, l?
:
As all operations we define here share some characteristics, we define a general mapping operation schema next.
MapOp

∆HMFS; HashCode idx < capacity capacity = capacity loadfactor = loadfactor
The map parameters cannot change and the current modified index is within capacity. Also, with HashCode inclusion, we extract the hash code key (hck!) from an object identity (o?) (i.e., hashCode() result), which is used by the hashing function (hf ) in mapping operations.
After that, we define each abstract operations above for the hash map implementation. To create a file, an element will be added into the map, hence it must be able to increase, and the current index is the result of the hashing function on the given object identity (o?).
CreateFile MapOp
The effect is to update the map at the given index with an empty file, which resembles what the (abstract) Create operation does. As o? is nowhere in the map (o? / ∈ dom (ran (hm i)) ), this update can never create a clash, hence no risk of duplicated empty entries appear.
Like the abstract Destroy, to remove a file, we need to know a mapped object instance that encodes the hash code key (o? ∈ dom (ran (hm idx)) ), and no change to the current index is made. This implicitly means the map cannot be empty, hence decreasing the size by one is allowed.
RemoveFile MapOp
For the map update, we need to remove from the map (hm) all (possibly clashed) references from o? at the current index (idx). This is achieved with a special sequence (anti-) filtering operation, which is defined below.
It removes from a sequence s all elements from a set A, and is defined in terms of sequence filtering and antisymmetric set difference, with respect to their common elements (generic) type (X). The other two data operations change neither the current index, nor the map size. They have an added offset from which to seek through the selected file, which is related to the hash code key (o?) that must be known into the HashMap at the current index.
That is, hm idx returns an injective sequence of entry pairs at the current index. From this sequence, we extract using ran the resulting (OID, FFILE) pairs, which are functional. At last, the chosen object instance (o?) from which to calculate the hash code key is the one to be projected within the available pairs using dom. Trying to explain one of the "gloomy" moments mentioned above, note the stronger (hidden) invariant that ran (hm idx) ∈ OID → FFILE. Originally, Entry did not have this "side condition" restriction, but it became clearer whilst proving the forward simulation refinement of the next two operations. In fairness, JML had already (cryptically) hinted this as With this structural resemblance in mind, the concrete file writing operation is performed similarly, provided the appropriate projections within the HashMap are made. To write data (d?) into a file (f ) associated with object instance o? at the given offset is just like the (abstract) Write operation above: padding the original file (f ) with zeros, and then overriding the d? on the shifted file. The projection for the old file (f ) associated with the given object instance (o?) is extracted by the (OID × FFILE) pairs (p = ran e) from the map Entry at the current index (e = hm idx). At last, only one pair (p o? = f ) from an Entry in the final map (e = hm idx) is updated. For the sake of higher automation levels, we rewrite this update adequately ( (o?, f ) ∈ p ). As the pairs (p ) are functional, the invariant is indirectly preserved via type enforcement (for p ).
Similarly, to read data (d!) from a valid file (f ) associated with the given object instance (o?) is just like the (abstract) Read operation above: extract the requested length from the subfile given by ( after ) at the correct offset, provided the precise projected pair is chosen (p = ran (hm idx)).
ReadData
MapDataOp; len? :
. len?) ( (p o?) after offs? )
Alternatively, we could have defined these operations with extra auxiliary variables in MapDataOp, then have them hidden within both operations adequately. The choice for existential predicates was due to better automation levels, as the relationship with the abstract operations becomes clear once the structural resemblance after projecting from the concrete data structures is adequately explained.
Retrieve relation
As already mentioned, the Java HashMap specification was not originally thought as functional pairs within an injective sequence, as defined by Entry. This came up as the result of a refuted simulation proof for one of the concrete operations, which in turn led to the re-design and adjustment of all other operations and their proofs. And this is the heuristical nature of simulation proofs: refined refutations [15] . Thus, the final retrieve relation, as presented here, is somewhat artificial, if not miraculously mysterious. Like in the "Procrustean bed" mythological tale of strict adjustment (in our case to paper size), it defies the sharp minded (and iterative) process of establishing refinement through theorem proving (i.e., we have around 50 changing versions up to the final one), which affords evidence to the great value mechanisation adds to the correct understanding of the problem being modelled.
The only interesting feature to be added here is how to abstractly relate the file identifiers (FID) with object instances (OID). We assume there will be some data type structure which adds the necessary information for establishing this relationship,
provided at least one of such structures exists (i.e., we can always provide an existential witness for STRUCTURE). This important, yet at first concealed detail, is another beneficial outcome from the mechanisation effort.
At last, we define the injection relating structured (abstract) file identifiers to (concrete) object instances.
Finally, the retrieve relation establishes that the map size is related to the abstract file store cardinality, and similarly, the maximum number of files it can have is set to balancing capacity factors within the HashMap. Next, we define how (FID × STRUCT) pairs from the file store (fs) are related to the object instances (OID) within the HashMap entries.
Retrieve HMFS; FFS
Furthermore, after linking the different IDs, we also need to define how known file values on both fs and hm are related through the corresponding relIDS relationship provided by STRUCT, which always have a witness structure since it is defined as P 1 STRUCTURE.
Preconditions
The preconditions for both abstract and concrete operations are summarised in Table 1 below. The abstract operations require the knowledge about file identifiers (fid?) within the file store (fs), whereas a similar property is required for object instances (o?) within the HashMap (hm). 
InitFS
N 1 • dom m = 0 . . c? − 1 ∧ a = ∅ ∧ (∀ o : OID; i : dom m • i = hf ((a o), c?)) ∧ (∀ j : dom m • m j = ) ) CreateF (∀ i : dom hm • o? / ∈ dom (ran (hm i))) ∧ size < capacity * loadfactor Remove o? ∈ dom (ran (hm idx)) ∧ size > 1 ReadD o? ∈ dom (ran (hm idx)) WriteD o? ∈ dom (ran (hm idx))
Table 1. Operations precondition table
The interesting (less obvious) preconditions are on the concrete initialisation and create file operations. The concrete initialisation requires the existence of a map (m) instantiated with room for the given (strictly positive) capacity (c?), as well as a valid hashCode() algorithm (a = ∅) mapping object instances (o) spread across the HashMap indexes (i ∈ dom m), where all files for such indexes are empty (m j = ). The strictly positive capacity and hashCode() algorithm availability is trivially true in practice, since a boundary check (c? ≥ 1) is made at instantiation time, and all Java Objects have a default hashCode() implementation as the (unique) object address in memory. Nevertheless, this default implementation might not always be the best one from an implementation point of view, as according to the Java documentation hashCode() implementations should be consistent with respect to equals(Object o) (see HashCode definition in Section 4.1). The interesting property in this initialisation precondition is to ensure all map entries are initially empty. It is important as it represents the instantiation of Entry objects in Java (see InitHMFS in Section 4.2).
The concrete file creation requires that the given object instance key (o?) to create an empty file ( ) for is not known within the HashMap, and that there is enough space the map to add a new pair ((o?, ) ). The object instance must be unknown to avoid useless clashes with the empty file, and it also serve to ensure consistency of map entries within maps themselves (see Entry in Section 4.1).
Mechanisation issues
Due to the nature of the mapping structure using Entry, the mapping operations described above have subtle nuances that only come to light with the interrogatory nature of a theorem proving exercise. It also creates an opportunity for a general theory to be reused elsewhere, which is tuned with the essence of verified software repository. The use of injections to relate (abstract) given set data types is also a quite useful general technique that is widely applicable. This is justified a general theory for injective entities, also needed by the work with the previous pilot project on Mondex [27] . For instance, both Mondex and POSIX works hinted the need for a general theory for injective overriding, and injective sequence concatenation.
And it does not stop there: both projects generated opportunities for general theories most probably useful elsewhere. In particular, theories that are also not only amenable for mechanisation, but also highly automated ones. This includes strategies for calculating preconditions of deeply nested schema inclusions and promotions; a general relationship between definite description (µ) and theta (θ) expressions (i.e., an one-point-mu law), where the former (µ) is more cryptic whereas the latter (θ) is preferred both for clarity and automation efficiency issues; and so on. Thus, paradoxically, as pointed out in [19, p.108] , proving a more general (and powerful) theory is easier, and in our case also more profitable! Regarding automation levels for POSIX itself, the major "show stopper" was the lack of lemmas establishing properties for entries. Once these lemmas we in place, proofs about the concrete operations, such as preconditions and consistency checks, were discharged quite smoothly. On the other hand, despite being a quite laborious and time consuming task, proving such properties for Entry exposed many important missing features that were added incrementally, as already briefly mentioned above.
Mechanisation statistics
A good metric for the complexity of a proof is the number of creative interactions required for its successful completion, yet this metric can be misleading. A proof with few interactions is rather like a successful attempt at pushbutton search: it does not reveal the underlying argument being proved. In Table 2 (left), we summarise some benchmarks in terms of proof steps complexity spread across different proof scripts for varied mechanisation entities that are stated as conjectures to be proved as theorems. We divide (1337) proof steps in three levels of complexity: (i) trivial steps (48%) are those blindly (and repetitively) selected, and they heavily rely on the adequate automation rules included for Z/Eves; (ii) intermediate steps (34.8%) are those requiring some understanding of how Z/Eves conducts the predicate transformation whilst doing proof, and are often repetitive; and (iii) creative steps (17.2%) are those requiring domain knowledge, such as instantiation of existential variables in the middle of a proof. There are three kinds of such conjectures: (i) additional automation rules for extended data types and toolkit definitions, such as injective functional overriding and injective sequence concatenation for Entry; (i) axiomatic consistency and domain checks to ensure partial functions are applied with their domains; and (iii) lemmas and theorems used to structure precondition and simulation calculations. Most of the additional automation rules arise from automating the type-checking of extended types and operations over such types, which leaves room for generalisation and reuse, as discussed in Section 6. Among the 38 Z paragraphs comprising axiomatic definitions, given sets, abbreviations, and schemas, we defined 219 conjectures (and companion proof scripts), as summarised in Table 2 (right). Finally, Table 2 (bottom) breaks down the proof steps per each Z/Eves proof command we used.
Complexity Steps
Conclusions
In this work, we have successfully mechanised an abstract POSIX -like file-store specification [16] using the Z/Eves theorem prover [21] . We also provided a concrete implementation based in Java HashMaps that is lifted from JML annotations [1] . These annotations are pre and postconditions, as well as class and loop invariants. From these two data types, we proved a forward simulation showing the HashMap implementation refines the abstract file store.
In the quest to formally specify a POSIX file store, we divided the work suggested in [14] following an orthogonal architecture provided in [12] that enables separation and later combination of concerns, such as functional requirements, fault-tolerant imperatives, and various hardware devices. This is crucially important in order to allow collaborative work among scientists with different interests and backgrounds to collaborate in completing the challenge.
In this paper, we tackle part of the functional requirements for a subset of APIs relevant to the challenge, and prove a refinement towards a concrete data structure that is amenable for prototyping. In this process, we came across an opportunity to generalise properties proved for injective entities so that work in other formalism and corresponding tools could benefit. In fact, we have actually reused some of these general findings from previous work in another pilot project on smart-cards [27] . This is in accord with the Verified Software Repository providing a harbour to verified designs and significant verification experiments.
Our efforts are aimed at a particular "user" (NASA 's JPL), hence we concentrate on an initial small subset of functionality of their interest. But the work is being constructed so that this choice does not compromise the grand challenge scientific ideals of purity, generality, and accuracy beyond current needs. This is possible because we follow Intel 's architecture mentioned above [12] , hence we have a modular project development strategy. The results of this work are collected and available on-line at the VSR repository at SourceForge [6] .
Collaboration and exploitation The choice for Java
HashMap is quite beneficial. It not only provides an efficient (and well-known) implementation for the abstract file store that is amenable for prototyping, but it also serves as a new Z (HashMap) data type that can be useful for different modelling purposes. Yet another indirect use could be to validate some JML properties in a theorem prover from the lifted JML description of HashMaps. And this idea has also been already done for Java sets [10] . As the collaboration with other scientists might not progress using Z, it is important that we find a way of trading assertions between different tools and techniques. This is achieved in two levels: (i) syntactic, with the aid of translators, say from Z to/from B [22] and JML; and (ii) semantic, with the aid of a common theoretical ground to trade proved theorems among different logics. This again is tuned with the VSR goals, and is fostered by the POSIX project we coordinate. Furthermore, as a result of using Z/Eves so effectively for both Mondex and POSIX projects, we are planning to make Z/Eves open source within VSR.
Future work Within the UNIX specification from [16] , there are still two other parts to be developed related to links and directories. In [3] , advances are being made towards flash-memory hardware integration. And following the architecture from [12] , there are many open issues to be addressed, such as different hardware devices, fault tolerant aspects, and further functionality aspects like multithreading and real-time, networking, or file permissions and encryption. One could also refine the concrete HashMap implementation down to a more sequential program, which can be used to compare with the JML specifications. Like the knight Perceval from Camelot, we ought to persevere in the quest for the verifying compiler.
